[MFD] Re: Resource Service updates for Security

[MFD] Re: Resource Service updates for Security

[MFD] Re: Resource Service updates for Security

Ira McDonald blueroofmusic at gmail.com
Wed May 13 22:20:23 UTC 2009


Hi Nancy,

Several vendors currently offer MFDs that incorporate virus
scanning of all files and executable modules and that CAN
integrate into enterprise antivirus update schemes.

Anyway, it was only an EXAMPLE (not a requirement) - though
I think you will find that network endpoint attachment protocols
and architectures are ALL going to require that you certify
that you have healthy onboard antivirus on your MFD in the
very near future.

MFDs running Linux or other general-purpose operating systems
are just too dangerous anymore without antivirus (or firewalls).

Cheers,
- Ira

Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
Blue Roof Music/High North Inc
email: blueroofmusic at gmail.com
winter:
 579 Park Place  Saline, MI  48176
 734-944-0094
summer:
 PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839
 906-494-2434


On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 5:49 PM, <nchen at okidata.com> wrote:

>
> Hi Ira,
>
> I agree that
>
> "The threat is EXECUTING those Resources on an Imaging
> System (the one hosting the Resource Service or ANY other
> Imaging System) or even a desktop client system."
>
> and
>
> "The Resource Service spec should NOT say anything,
> anywhere about internal versus external storage and
> should NEVER reference a Resource Repository."
>
> But I don't think "virus scan" is practical for an Imaging System like an
> MFD or HCD to verify whether the stored or retrieved Executable Resources is
> safe to execute. There are many other techniques to verify the integrity of
> these type of resources that are more practical for an MFD or HCD.
>
> Did I misunderstand something?
>
> -Nancy
>
>
>
>  *Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic at gmail.com>*
>
> 05/13/2009 05:01 PM
>   To
> nchen at okidata.com, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic at gmail.com>
>  cc
> mfd at pwg.org  Subject
> Re: Resource Service updates for Security
>
>
>
>
> Hi Nancy,
>
> Internal or external storage of the Resouces has NOTHING to
> do with the security threat in 11.4 below.
>
> The threat is EXECUTING those Resources on an Imaging
> System (the one hosting the Resource Service or ANY other
> Imaging System) or even a desktop client system.
>
> The Resource Service spec should NOT say anything,
> anywhere about internal versus external storage and
> should NEVER reference a Resource Repository.
>
> Every reference in 11.1 through 11.3 to Resource
> Repository should be deleted.  Users do NOT know
> where a Resource Service stores things - if a vendor
> does such an extension, then that vendor has broken
> good security practice in their system design and
> will justifiably fail independent security audits.
>
> The Resource Service is completely responsible *on its
> own* for every Resource that it stores (anywhere) or allows
> an authenticated user to retrieve (from the Resource
> Service, that is).
>
> Any network system that hosts a Resource Service
> is, by definition, an Imaging System - it may not be
> dedicated (single-purpose), but it's still an Imaging
> System.
>
> Another way of putting it is that "Imaging System"
> is NOT simply a synonym for "Multifunction Device"
> - it's a wider definition that includes Spoolers and
> network server-hosted Imaging Services.
>
> Cheers,
> - Ira
>
> Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
> Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
> Blue Roof Music/High North Inc
> email: blueroofmusic at gmail.com
> winter:
> 579 Park Place  Saline, MI  48176
> 734-944-0094
> summer:
> PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839
> 906-494-2434
>
>
> On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 12:16 PM, <nchen at okidata.com> wrote:
>
> >
> > Hi Ira,
> >
> > Thanks for the text for the Security Consideration.
> >
> > Here are something I need to clarify, and some comments.
> >
> > 11.4  - Security Threats from Executable Resources
> >
> > It's not clear to me whether the security problem described here is for -
> > 1) storing Executable Resources at an external storage location that
> > involves an external system for storing the resource, and the Resource
> > Service is hosted by an Imaging System. Or,
> > 2) storing Executable Resources internally within the Imaging System that
> > hosts the Resource Service.
> >
> > In both cases the security threat is to the Imaging System.
> >
> > If it's case 1) - I agree that the external system "SHOULD verify the
> > safety of such resources (e.g., by virus scanning)". But we agreed in
> last
> > face-to-face meeting that it's out of scope of Resource Service to
> consider
> > anything related to the external storage system. What Resource Service
> > should consider is the restriction of the storage and retrieval
> operations
> > on such resources to authorized users. How the external storage system
> > should protect the stored executable resources is out of scope. Although
> I
> > prefer to recommend some security objectives to be considered by the
> > external storage system.
> >
> > If it's case 2) - I don't think we should give "virus scanning" as an
> > example to an Imaging System to protect the stored Executable Resources.
> > Virus scanning or intrusion detection techniques are common in PCs, but
> > rarely existent in Imaging Systems. It's simply not that practical for an
> > Imaging System to have such software implemented which involves constant
> > maintenance of upto-date virus signatures by external systems. At the
> > abstract level, we can provide some good security objectives to consider
> for
> > the Imaging System, such as protection of confidentiality and integrity
> of
> > the resources and their related metadata. Like case 1), the storage and
> > retrieval of operations on such resources must to restricted to
> authorized
> > users.
> >
> > A Resource Service could be hosted by a computer remote to the Imaging
> > System that is under security consideration. We should consider this case
> > too.
> >
> > 11.5 - Security Threats from Static Resources
> >
> > Static resources that have associated Intellectual Property rights or
> > license rights that involves metadata such as DateTimeOfExpiration which
> > should also be protected for alteration. Therefore, not only storage or
> > retrieval operations on Resources must be restricted, other operations on
> > resource metadata must be restricted too.
> >
> > Aslo the security problem you described here is for storing Static
> > Resources internally in an Imaging System that hosts the Resource
> Service.
> > We should also consider the case when the Resource Service could be
> hosted
> > by a computer remote to the Imaging System.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > -Nancy
> >
> >
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Principal Engineer
> > Solutions and Technology
> > Oki Data
> > 2000 Bishops Gate Blvd.
> > Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054
> > Phone: (856) 222-7006
> > Email: nchen at okidata.com
> >
> >
> >
> >  *Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic at gmail.com>*
> >
> > 05/12/2009 03:15 PM
> >   To
> > mfd at pwg.org, NancyChen <nchen at okidata.com>, Ira McDonald <
> > blueroofmusic at gmail.com>  cc
> >   Subject
> > Resource Service updates for Security
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Hi Nancy,                                          Tuesday (12 May 2009)
> >
> > Per my action from the Resource Service review during the April PWG
> > meeting, below is some text for the Security Considerations section of
> > the Resource Service.
> >
> > 11.4 Security Threats from Executable Resources
> >
> > Resources with a ResourceCategory of 'Executable' MUST be handled with
> > special care by implementations of the Resource Service.  Such resources
> > can pose serious threats to the integrity of the Imaging System that
> > hosts the Resource Service.  In particular, such Resources can be used
> > to introduce Trojan Horses to the Imaging System.  If an implementation
> > of the Resource Service supports Executable resources, then that
> > implementation MUST restrict the storage of such resources (e.g., to
> > authorized administrators and manufacturers) and SHOULD verify the
> > safety of such resources (e.g., by virus scanning).
> >
> > 11.5 Security Threats from Static Resources
> >
> > Resources with ResourceCategory of 'Static' SHOULD be treated with
> > special care by implementations of the Resource Service.  Fonts that
> > have associated Intellectual Property rights (e.g., as part of their
> > network licenses) can pose serious threats to the availability of the
> > Imaging System that hosts the Resource Service - security audits can
> > result in the shutdown or physical removal of the Imaging System.  If an
> > implementation of the Resource Service supports Static resources that
> > have associated Intellectual Property rights, then that implementation
> > SHOULD restrict the storage of such resources (e.g., to authorized
> > administrators and manufacturers) and SHOULD restrict the retrieval of
> > such resources (e.g., to a configured group of authorized users).
> >
> > Comments?
> >
> > Cheers,
> > - Ira
> >
> > Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
> > Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
> > Blue Roof Music/High North Inc
> > email: blueroofmusic at gmail.com
> > winter:
> > 579 Park Place  Saline, MI  48176
> > 734-944-0094
> > summer:
> > PO Box 221  Grand Marais, MI 49839
> > 906-494-2434
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>

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