How long are we going to keep revisiting
this issue? We have a solution that meets
our charter and I thought we had consensus.
What IPP over TCP?
What about fonts?
Do we use binary or ASCII encoding?
I think we have a model and have resolved
our issues. Lets go with this and see what
happens in the deployment of the proposed
standard we have....
Randy
Carl-Uno Manros wrote:
>> At 01:43 PM 12/19/97 +0100, Harald.T.Alvestrand at uninett.no wrote:
> >
> >moore at cs.utk.edu said:
> >> The alternative is for IPP to convince IESG that digest
> >> authentication alone really is adequate for a wide variety of printer
> >> authentication scenarios. I won't claim that it cannot be done,
> >> but offhand, I don't see how to do this.
> >
> >The third alternative is, of course, to claim that the WG is now convinced
> >that it's acceptable for an IPP client to be unable to print on any
> >printer that requires non-shared-secret authentication.
> >This did not seem to be the consensus in Washington, but after all,
> >the list, not the meeting, is the final arbiter of IETF WG consensus.
> >
> >Remember - you are the domain experts who are supposed to know what the
> >requirements for a print protocol are; the IESG requirement is that:
> >
> >- It's possible for all conformant implementations to be able to
> > interwork, if configured to do so
> >- Whatever functions must be implemented use neither cleartext passwords
> > nor encumbered technology, if possible
> >
> >If ability of a client to print on a TLS-only-configured printer is not
> >in your requirements set, then that should not be a requirement.
> >
> > Harald A
>> Well,
>> It seems that Harald has a more liberal view on this than Keith. This seems
> to open up the possibility to to recommend that all clients SHOULD support
> TLS, but not make it an absolute MUST.
>> Comments?
>> Carl-Uno