Hi Ira,
Can you also add ipptool updates / IPP Everywhere Self-Certification toolset updates to the agenda? Want to discuss for ~5 minutes.
Smith
> On Apr 21, 2021, at 8:22 AM, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic at gmail.com> wrote:
>> Hi Mike and Smith,
>> Excellent - I'll add this to IPP WG agenda for tomorrow - will send agenda this afternoon.
>> Cheers,
> - Ira
> Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect)
> Chair - SAE Trust Anchors and Authentication TF
> Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG
> Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG
> Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG
> Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group
> Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG
> IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB
> Blue Roof Music / High North Inc
>http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic <http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic>
>http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc <http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc>
> mailto: blueroofmusic at gmail.com <mailto:blueroofmusic at gmail.com>
> (permanent) PO Box 221 Grand Marais, MI 49839 906-494-2434
>>> On Wed, Apr 21, 2021 at 8:31 AM Kennedy, Smith (Wireless & IPP Standards) via ipp <ipp at pwg.org <mailto:ipp at pwg.org>> wrote:
> Wow, thanks for finding this! I’m sure that enterprises would prefer using S/MIME. We should definitely review this and work to restore S/MIME in TRUSTNOONE if we believe it is appropriate.
>> Cheers,
> Smith
> ---
> Smith Kennedy
>smith.kennedy at hp.com <mailto:smith.kennedy at hp.com>
>>>> On Apr 21, 2021, at 4:28 AM, Michael Sweet via ipp <ipp at pwg.org <mailto:ipp at pwg.org>> wrote:
>>>> All,
>>>> Somehow we missed this, but the IETF published an update to S/MIME in April of 2019:
>>>>https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8551 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8551>
>>>> Among other things, this update addresses the EFAIL cryptographic vulnerability in S/MIME by adding support for some new cipher suites with Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) instead of the old (insecure) Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode.
>>>> Using S/MIME bring the advantage that it shares most of the infrastructure that is already in place for TLS, particularly when it comes to trusting a third party. PGP depends on the "web of trust" for this and may not be as attractive to some.
>>>> Thoughts?
>>>> ________________________
>> Michael Sweet
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