attachment-0001
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Randy,</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">Yes, I should have used ConfigurationState
as the example. </font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">No, your interpretation of CertificationState
is correct (and better thought out than our original) and we do need some
specifier for it to work. This would be a phase 2 work item for the
IDS group. However, note that this *could* be a CertificationState
if so defined.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">In the example I was just trying to
point out the usefulness of these elements and why I think they should
remain the specification. They can provide a level of remote attestation
that, I think, would be useful.</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">dhw</font>
<br>
<br><font size=2 face="sans-serif">David H. Whitehead<br>
Development Engineer<br>
Lexmark International, Inc.<br>
859.825.4914<br>
davidatlexmarkdotcom</font>
<br>
<br>
<br>
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<td width=40%><font size=1 face="sans-serif"><b>Randy Turner <rturner@amalfisystems.com></b>
</font>
<br><font size=1 face="sans-serif">Sent by: ids-bounces@pwg.org</font>
<p><font size=1 face="sans-serif">06/23/09 07:17 PM</font>
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<div align=right><font size=1 face="sans-serif">To</font></div>
<td><font size=1 face="sans-serif">ids@pwg.org</font>
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<td>
<div align=right><font size=1 face="sans-serif">cc</font></div>
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<td>
<div align=right><font size=1 face="sans-serif">Subject</font></div>
<td><font size=1 face="sans-serif">Re: [IDS] CertificationState and remote
attestation</font></table>
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<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>Hi Dave,<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>I always thought "certification state" was
some value that was<br>
"approved" by some 3rd party certification organization.<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>And I thought "configuration state" might
be something akin to what<br>
you have derived below.<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>"Certification State" was something similar
to what I included in a<br>
previous email regarding FIPS certification. For "products"
that are<br>
certified, the certification is for a particular model number and<br>
software version. If you're just certifying a software module (like<br>
openssl), then you would provide the cert lab with a version and<br>
either source or binary module, pre-configured to execute the cert<br>
tests.<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>That's why I stressed that any "validation module"
that wants to<br>
verify the HCD_configuration_state needs to know "WHICH" certification<br>
that this value reflects, and WHAT the correct value should be. For
a<br>
FIPS certification, this would be "FIPS 140-2" and "FF02CH001F00"
(a<br>
sample hash/fingerprint)<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Example certifications might be:<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Common Criteria (possibly multiple certifications)<br>
FIPS<br>
ICSA (for firewall/security appliances)<br>
"Works with Vista" or any of the half-dozen Microsoft logo certs
you<br>
can test against<br>
</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>My interpretations of these HCD_configuration and
HCD_certification<br>
states are based on what I think are the original rationale (going way<br>
back) for these values...<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Based on my understanding of "certification state",
we would need to<br>
support "one or more" certification states, depending upon how
many<br>
different types of certifications<br>
are maintained by the device.<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>If my interpretation of the rationale for certification
and<br>
configuration states differs from the group, I'm sure someone will let<br>
me know :)<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>Randy<br>
</font></tt>
<br>
<br><tt><font size=2>On Jun 23, 2009, at 8:39 AM, Dave Whitehead wrote:<br>
</font></tt>
<br><tt><font size=2>><br>
> So, would something like the following be of use?<br>
><br>
><br>
> Device with device certificate and key pair. (Same for SHV)<br>
><br>
> Device also has certificate of SHV. (and vise versa)<br>
><br>
> CertificationState = Hash(all required HCD attributes)<br>
><br>
> CertificationStatement = CurrentDataTime + CertificationState<br>
><br>
> CertificationIntegrity = Sign(CertificationStatement, Device[PrivKey])<br>
><br>
> HCD_CertificationState = Encrypt(CertificationIntegrity, SHV[PubKey])<br>
><br>
><br>
> Just wondering ...<br>
><br>
> dhw<br>
><br>
> David H. Whitehead<br>
> Development Engineer<br>
> Lexmark International, Inc.<br>
> 859.825.4914<br>
> davidatlexmarkdotcom<br>
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